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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of U ta.h, 
Pla.intiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9347 
BRIEF OF RES·P·O·NDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent sets forth the following statement 
of facts, in addition to those in the brief for appellant. 
In 1957 the Utah Legislature passed House Bill Number 
30 on 13 March 1957, to take effect on 14 May 1957. It 
was passed as Chapter 124, Laws of Utah 1957, and 
amended portions of Title 59, Utah Code Annotated, 
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1953. Section 59-14-71 thereof provided for the with-
holding of wages of non-resident employees .. 
In the 1959 session of the Utah Legislature two bills 
were submitted affecting Section 59-14-71, U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended. House Bill Number 93 was introduced and 
took effect on 12 May 1959 as Chapter 111, Laws of 
Utah 1959. Senate Bill Number 58 took effect on 12 May 
1959 as Chapter 112, Laws of Utah 1959. Thus both bills 
became effective the same day. 
Senate Bill 58 passed the Senate on 26 January 
1959 and passed the second House on 18 February 1959. 
It was signed by the Governor on 4 March 1959. House 
Bill 93 passed the House of Representatives on 23 Feb-
ruary 1959, or just a few days subsequent to the dual 
house passage of Senate Bill 58, and before the latter 
bill had been signed by the Governor. Thereafter, House 
Bill 93 was passed by the other House on 11 March 1959 
and signed by the Governor on 18 March 1959. Both acts 
came into effect on 12 May 1959, the same day. The 
titles of both acts cover various aspects of Title 59, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
The obvious purpose of. both enactments was to pro-
vide that all employees within the state, and some resident 
employees without, be covered by wage withholding pro-
visions as to income tax due the State of Utah. 
The enactments, Chapter 111 and Chapter 112, Laws 
of Utah 1959, were not inconsistent with each other and, 
as a consequence, based upon an opinion of the Attorney 
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General, 59-029, they were consolidated in Section 59-14-
71, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON EMPLOYERS 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 111 OF THE 
LAWS OF UTAH 1959, REQUIRING THE COLLECTION 
AND REMISSION OF STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE 
STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT COMPENSATION IS NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF EITHER THE STATE OR FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
POINT II. 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 DOES 
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 22, ARTICLE VI, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT III. 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS NOT 
INVALID FOR ANY IMPERFECTIONS APPEARING 
IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 
POINT IV. 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT BINDING UPON 
THE APPELLANT, AND ALL OTHERS WHOM IT 
PURPORTS TO AFFECT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON EMPLOYERS 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 111 OF THE 
LAWS OF UTAH 1959, REQUIRING THE COLLECTION 
AND REMISSION OF STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE 
STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT COMPENSATION IS NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF EITHER THE STATE OR FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Appellant contends that since Chapter 111, Laws of 
Utah 1959 makes no provision to reimburse employers 
for the collection and withholding of taxes under the act 
that it violates due process of law and constitutes the 
imposition of an involuntary servitude. Appellant recog-
nizes that the United States Supreme Court has held in 
Brushaker v. Union. Pacific Railroad Compooy, 240 U.S. 
1, 60 L. Ed. 493 (1915) that the appellant's arguments 
is without merit. Indeed, the court did, for it said: 
''So far as the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that 
there is no basis for such reliance since it is 
equally well settled that such clause is not a limi-
tation upon the taxing power conferred upon 
Congress by the Constitution; in other words 
that the Constitution does not conflict with itself 
by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power 
and taking the same power away on the other by 
the limitation of the due process clause." 
Hence, the Court held that there was no violation 
of due process since the requirement that one collect the 
tax at its source was merely incidental to the taxing 
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power. The Court therefore reasoned the collection of 
corporate income taxes was not in violation of the Con-
stitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has not remained 
silent since the above case. In the case of Pierce Oil 
Corporation v. Hopkins, 264 U. S. 137 (1924), the Su-
preme Court had before it a law of the State of Arkansas 
requiring the seller of gasoline to collect a sales tax 
from the purchaser, and remit the same to state without 
reimbursement. There Mr. Justice Brandies, speaking 
for a majority of the Court, stated: 
"The claim that the act violates the due 
process clause rests upon the argument that the 
tax levies is a privilege tax for the use of the 
highways by the purchasers ; that the seller is 
required to pay the tax laid on the purchasers * * * 
the seller is not afforded the means of reimburs-
ing himself; and that, moreover, the mere process 
of collecting the tax from the purchaser, and 
making monthly reports and payments, subjects 
the seller to an appreciable expense. A short 
answer to this argument is that the seller is 
directed to collect the tax from the purchaser 
when he makes the sale; and that a State which 
has, under its constitution, power to regulate the 
business of selling gasoline (and doubtless, also, 
the power to tax the privilege of carrying on that 
business) is not prevented by the due process 
clause from imposing the incidental burden.'' 
The federal courts have not been alone in deciding 
that the failure to provide for reimbursement to a 
private party for collecting and remitting a tax is not 
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violative of due process. See Tamrner v. State, 190 So. 
292 (Ala. 1939); Woodrich v. St. Catherine Gravel Co., 
195 So. 307 (Miss. 1940). The Colorado Supreme Court 
felt of a similar view in Porter v. Armstrong, 132 P. 2d 
788 (Colo.). The Court there held that requirement that 
an attorney collect a professional service tax imposed 
on his clients and remit the same to the state did not 
violate the state or federal due process clauses. 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
are binding on the issue the federal due process clause, 
and since our own state provision on due process, Article 
I, Section 7, was patterned after the federal provision, 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court are highly 
persuasive as to the application of that clause of our 
state Constitution. Untermyer v. State Taa; Commission, 
102 Utah 214, 129 P. 2d 881. It would appear, therefore, 
in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary, 
that Article I, Section 7 should not be deemed to prevent 
the Legislature from establishing the requirements it 
has in Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959. Appellant in 
his brief contends that the complexities of accountings 
to state and federal government makes necessary the 
expense of employing special persons. He contends that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated 
that if the burden becomes confiscatory it would be 
violative of due process. However, appellant makes the 
mistake of combining the ~eparate actions of two distinct 
sovereigns, the federal and the state, to claim his burden. 
The only issue before this Court as to due process is 
whether the burden imposed by the State of Utah is so 
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confiscatory. It should be remembered that 1959 was 
the first year in which this power was used. Therefore, 
the state's actions at present are no more burdensome 
than those originally considered legal by the federal and 
state courts. 
Appellant also claims that the burden of remitting 
and collecting taxes without compensation imposes an 
involuntary servitude. The Thirteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution, and Section 22, Article I of 
our State Constitution, prohibit the imposition of slavery 
or involuntary servitude. These provisions are usually 
deemed personal, 48 C.J.S. 766; Slaughter House Cases, 
16 Wall 36, and, therefore, it is questionable whether 
appellant, a municipal corporation, drawing its very 
life from the state, may complain of such actions or 
even avail itself of these constitutional provisions. Even 
assuming that appellant can claim these rights, the over-
whelming weight of authority is to the effect that in this 
instance the claim is without merit. 
In State ex rel. Arn v. Tax Commission, 163 Kan. 
240, 181 P. 2d 532 (1947), the Kansas Supreme Court 
held a requirement imposed upon sellers of gasoline to 
collect a sales tax from their purchasers, which was 
imposed on the purchasers, and remit it to the state did 
not constitute an involuntary servitude. There the 
Kansas Court said : 
''It is alleged Chapter 271 requires vendors 
of motor fuels to collect and to make the tax 
without compensation, and in doing so subjects 
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them to involuntary servitude, in violation of sec-
tion 6 of our Bill of Rights. This section of our 
Bill of Rights is tantamount to the 13th amend-
ment of our Federal constitution. Respecting that 
it was said, in Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332, 
36 S. Ct. 258, 259 60 L. Ed. 672: 'This .Amend-
ment was adopted with reference to conditions 
existing since the foundation of our government, 
and the term "involuntary servitude" was intend-
ed to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin 
to African slavery which, in practical operation, 
would tend to produce like undesirable results. It 
introduced no novel doctrine with respect of 
services always treated as exceptional, and cer-
tainly was not intended to interdict enforcement 
of those duties which individuals owe to the state, 
such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, 
etc. The great purpose in view was liberty under 
the protection of effective government, not the 
destruction of the latter by depriving it of essen-
tial powers.' (Citing cases.) 
"It is generally recognized that an individual 
may be required to give services to a state with-
out compensation, Crews v. Lundquist, 361 TIL 
193, 197 N.E. 768. Indeed, it is a common prac-
tice, both for the Federal government and for the 
state to call upon citizens to perform some serv-
ice for the state without compensation.'' 
In Porter v. Armstrong, supra, the Court also re~ 
jected the issue of involuntary servitude. See also John-
son v. Dictendorf, 56 Idaho 620, 57 P. 2d 1068; Morrow v. 
Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P. 2d 1016; Ranier Na-
tional Park Co. v. Martin, 18 Fed. Supp. 60. 
This Court may take judicial notice of the history 
underlying the passage of involuntary servitude amend-
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ments. It is undisputed that they principally arose to 
abolish slavery and to give constitutional effect to the 
emancipation proclamation. 
Recent cases have also affirmed against the argu-
ment appellant now contends for. In Abney v. Camp-
bell, 206 F. 2d 836, the issue was the uncompensated col-
lection and remission of F.I.C.A. taxes. The Court, In 
rejecting the involuntary servitude issue, stated: 
''The enforcement of the act is not the impo-
sition of a servitude. It is the collection of a tax 
and the enforcement of an obligation which under 
settled Federal law appellants may be and are 
lawfully subjected to * * *. It cannot be a viola-
tion of the 13th Amendment.'' 
And in Porth v. Brodrick, 214 F. 2d 925 (1954) as 
to self employment taxes : 
''Any servitude resulting from requirements 
of tax laws would not be the kind of involuntary 
servitude referred to in the Constitution.'' 
Most recently the almost identical issue raised by 
the appellant here was before the Indiana Court, and 
rejected. Akers v. Handley, 149 N.E. 2d 692 (Ind. 1958). 
It is submitted that the requirements imposed upon 
appellant by Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959, are 
neither unusual nor severe. To allow the proposition 
the appellant contends for would require every action 
that a citizen may be required to do by a state to be 
compensated. The police powers, and those other powers 
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incidental to the proper functioning of government 
would be subjugated to other provisions of the Consti-
tution which cannot be so construed, nor were so intended 
by their framers. 
POINT II. 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 DOES 
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 22, ARTICLE VI, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides in part : 
''The vote upon the final passage of all bills 
shall be by yeas and nays ; and no law shall be 
revised or amended by reference to its title only; 
but the act as revised or section as amended, shall 
be re-enacted and published at length.'' 
The purpose of this constitutional provision was to 
make certain that the members of the Legislature had 
before them more than the mere title of a proposed 
amendment, but that they have before them the substance 
of the bill so that they may see in general what it pur-
ports to do. As was said in State v. Beddo,. 22 Utah 432, 
63 Pac. 96: 
''This is a wise provision of the Constitution, 
and was intended to avoid that confusion which 
would inevitably follow, if an act or section could 
be revised or amended by mere reference to the 
title, or section, or word or line." 
Thus the purpose of such a provision when read in 
context with the other restrictions placed upon the 
10 
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Legislature's procedures becomes clear. It is obvious 
that it was intended to make certain that the Legislature 
had some substantive knowledge of its action. 
However, the legislation must be clearly amendatory 
and not additive, before constitutional provisions like 
ours become effective. Thus where an act is merely 
claimed to be amendatory and is not amendatory in 
form, the courts have generally classified the legislation 
as not being amendatory. Sutherland, Statutory Con-
struction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1917. In Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 
Ind. 194, the Court stated: 
''An act is independent when it embraces 
matter not previously legislated upon; or it may 
be independent where there is a law upon the 
subject, when the act does not attempt to amend 
such law, but makes a new enactment." 
This same doctrine has been adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Cluff v. Weber County 
Irr. Dist., 62 Utah 209, 218 Pac. 732 (1923), the follow-
ing language was used to express the principle: 
"True, it may be that some of the provisions 
of Chapter 68 may in practice be found to affect 
or modify other provisions relating to irrigation 
or water rights. That, however, is not what the 
Constitution forbids. Later laws are frequently 
enacted which in some way modify or affect 
earlier laws relating to the same subject matter. 
That such is the effect of later enactments is 
inevitable, and in no way contravenes the consti-
tutional provision that laws shall be amended only 
in a particular way. That provision has reference 
11 
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only to direct amendments, and not to conflicting 
provisions of separate and independent acts.'' 
In the instant case it is clear that Chapter 111, Laws 
of Utah 1959 was in reality not an amendatory act, but 
an act adding to the body of Utah law dealing with with-
holding taxes. An examination of the status of the law 
shows that in 1957 there was an act providing for with-
holding from non-resident employees. ·.Chapter 124, Laws 
of Utah 1957. Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959 did not 
change the provisions of the 1957 law except to add to 
its coverage provisions for resident employees who were 
not covered under the original act. The changes that 
resulted to non-resident employees were as a result of 
making the law uniform as to all employees. Any changes 
affecting the 1957 act were set out in length, but even 
so Chapter 111 was not amendatory but additive, and 
only incidentally affected the situation as it applied to 
non-residents. Therefore, it is submitted that under the 
doctrine set out by the Court in the case of State ex rel. 
Cluff v. Weber County Irr. Dist., supra, considering tha-t 
Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959 only incidentally affects 
non-resident employees, either under the 1957 law or in 
relation to Chapter 112, Laws of Utah 1959, and that it 
did not amend but added to the law at that time, Article 
VI, Section 22 has not been violated. 
Appellant contends in his brief that since Chapter 
112, Laws of Utah 1959 was signed by the Governor, 
before the provisions of Chapter 111, that the failure 
of Chapter 111 to include provisions of Chapter 112 
violated the constitutional requirement of amendment 
12 
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at length. Although it has already been concluded that 
Chapter 111 was not amendatory, it is submitted that 
an additional reason exists why the failure of Chapter 
111 to include the provisions of Chapter 112 is not viola-
tive of Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 25 of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides: 
''All acts shall be officially published, and 
no act shall take effect until so published, nor 
until sixty days after the adjournment of the 
session. at which it passed, unless the Legislature 
by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected 
to each house, shall otherwise direct.'' 
Both Chapters 111 and 112 of the Laws of Utah 
1959 came into effect at the same time, that is, on 12 
May 1960. Therefore, it is submitted that since Chapter 
112 did not become effective until the same day as did 
Chapter 111, there could be no requirement that Chapter 
111 have included within its terms any of the matter 
contained in Chapter 112. Especially is this so since 
House Bill93 which became Chapter 111 had been passed 
by one of the houses before Senate Bill 58, which became 
Chapter 112, had been signed by the Governor. If it is 
contended that acts submitted in the same session which 
cover related subjects must include each other, the con-
fusion would be manifest. If one bill were vetoed or not 
passed the other bill containing the same matter would 
also of necessity have to be dealt with in the same manner. 
The only thing which would correct such a situation 
would be an item veto which the Governor of this state 
does not possess. In addition, such a construction of 
13 
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Article VI, Section 22, would do violence to the very 
meaning of Article VI, Section 25, and certainly it is 
hornbook law that constitutional provisions should be 
construed as far as possible to make them harmonious 
and compatible. As was said in Shook v. Larufer, 100 
S.W. 1042 (Tex. 1907) where it was contended an act 
of the Legislature should be given effect prior to the 
time set out in the constitutional provision : 
"We also are of the opinion, * * * that if it 
was the intention of the legislature to make the 
provision under consideration refer to the date 
of the passage of the act, it would be an attempt 
to make the law partially operative sooner than 
permitted by the state Constitution, and would 
bring it in conflict with the provision of that 
instrument which prohibits acts passed in the 
manner this was from taking effect earlier than 
ninety days after adjournment of the session of 
the legislature.'' 
The Utah Supreme Court has itself indicated a 
position similar to that we now advocate. In Ha;nsen v. 
Morris, 3 U. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884 (1955), in response to 
a claim that one law repealed another, where they be-
come effective the same day, the Court said: 
"The contention that (3) the limitations sta-
tute, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951, was repealed 
by Chapter 58, same laws, seems without merit. 
Both were passed the same day and became effec-
tive on the same day.'' 
Certainly if two laws which become effective the 
same day cannot be said to repeal each other, so laws 
14 
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which become effective the same day cannot be said to 
amend each other, especially where there is no basic 
conflict between the two, and where they are compatible 
in dealing with different areas of the same general 
subject. 
If the proposition as contended for by the appel-
lant was adopted, no end of confusion and difficulty 
would result. If a bill on a general subject was passed 
by one house of the legislature, and another bill passed, 
also of the same general subject, by the other house, but 
with neither bill specifically in conflict with the other, 
as here, then each bill would have to encompass the 
other before it was finally passed by either house or 
face the objection of amendment without setting forth 
at length. Each house of the legislature would be the 
executive secretary of the other. 
It is submitted, therefore, that Chapter 111 of the 
Laws of Utah does not violate Article VI, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
POINT III. 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS NOT 
INVALID FOR ANY IMPERFECTIONS APPEARING 
IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 
Appellant contends that Chapter 111 of the Laws 
of Utah 1959 is unconstitutional because the subject 
matter of the act is not clearly expressed in the title 
and that the body and title are in irreconcilable conflict. 
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The title of Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959 states its 
general purpose as follows: 
''An Act Amending Section 59-14-65 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 
124, Laws of Utah 1957, Section 59-14-71 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 
124, Laws of Utah 1957 and Section 59-14-71.1, 
as Enacted by Chapter 124, Laws of Utah 1957, 
Providing for the Deduction and Withholding of 
Individual Income Tax from Wages Paid by Em-
ployers to Resident Employees; and Providing 
for the Reimbursement of Expenses in Inaugur-
ating and Administering the Withholding Provi-
sions of This Act.'' 
In construing the provisions of Section 23, Article 
VI of the Utah Constitution, which requires that the 
subject matter be clearly expressed in its title, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
"That the provision should be applied so as 
not to hamper the lawmaking power in framing 
and adopting comprehensive measures covering 
the whole subject * * *." 
Elder v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 Pac. 367. 
Other general rules of law are recognized as axioms 
by which courts should measure bills as against the con-
stitutional requirements. A statute should not be de-
clared unconstitutional simply because the court feels a 
better expression of the title could have been made. 
State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont. 348, 54 P. 2d 571 (1936). The 
act should be presumed constitutional until conclusively 
demonstrated to the contrary. Tonopah db G. R. Co. r. 
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N evada-Californria Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, 75 P. 2d 727 
(1938). The rule of law is well expressed in Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., Section 1704, 
where it is said: 
''The constitutional provision on titles is con-
strued liberally to sustain the validity of the title 
and the statute. Narrow or technical constructions 
are avoided and the statute will be read fairly 
and reasonably in order not to thwart reasonable 
legislative activity. Two purposes must be 
served : ( 1) Legislation must be kept free of 
abuses against which the provision is directed; 
and (2) legitimate enactments are not to be in-
validated by over-nice distinctions. 
The courts will not ascribe an intention to 
the legislature that will place an act in conflict 
with the Constitution. Hypercriticism will not be 
indulged. If the various provisions of a statute 
fairly may be regarded (J)S in furtherance of the 
gen,era.l object expressed in the title, the statute 
should be upheld." 
And as said in In Re Hadley, 336 Pa. 100, 6 A. 2d 87 4 
(1939): 
"Unless a substantive matter entirely discon-
nected with the named legislation is included 
within a bill, the act does not fall within the con-
stitutional inhibitions.'' 
A fair examination of the act in question shows that 
the title very clearly expresses the general subject under 
legislation; that of withholding taxes. It is contended 
by the appellant that the choice of the word ''reimburse-
ment" is so glaring in inconsistency that it totally de-
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feat the bill. It should be noted that nowhere in the 
title is there any indication of an intent to make pro-
vision to reimburse employers, nor is there such a pro-
vision contained in the body of the act. There is, how-
ever, a provision in the body of the act to compensate 
the two state agencies who bear the immense burden of 
the statute, the Finance and Tax Commissions. The 
word ''reimbursement'' should not be singled out from 
the phrase, and stress placed thereon to make it appear 
inappropriate. It should be read in context referring to 
the words "Inaugurating" and "Administering". It is 
obvious that the Tax Commission and the Finance Com-
mission must inaugurate and administer the act; there-
fore, when the body of the act provides the monies for 
such undertaking, there is obviously no inconsistency 
between body and title. It would be hypercriticism to 
say that the confusion here, if any, is so great as to be 
''entirely disconnected with the subject matter.'' 
In addition, it should be noted that the act took 
effect on 12 May 1959, but that it applied to the taxable 
year from 1 January 1959. 59-14-71.1, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. It is a matter of common knowledge that the 
Tax Commission and Finance Commission are given 
general budgetary appropriations for the administration 
of their offices, etc. Undoubtedly the necessity was 
raised upon the passage of the act, of making various 
changes and additions within these commissions. These 
would diminish the normal appropriation without addi-
tional funds; therefore, it would be necessary to "reim-
burse" the general fund by making an appropriation 
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for that purpose. This being what was done, it cannot 
be claimed the body and title of the act are in irreconcil-
able conflict. Possibly more definitive terms could have 
been used, but it is not for the courts to substitute their 
expressions in cool retrospect for those of the legislature. 
If the latter's expression is reasonably determined to 
apprise the legislator of the bill he is voting on, and not 
wholly unrelated to the body of it, it should not be 
struck down because more descriptive language could 
be found. 
Appellant further contends that Chapter 111, Laws 
of Utah 1959, is violative of Article VI, Section 23 
because it refers to "Resident Employees", whereas the 
act is susceptible to interpretation to cover all employees. 
It should be noted that under Section 2(b) of Chapter 
111, Laws of Utah, that employee is not defined with 
any special language directed towards non-resident em-
ployees. If non-resident employees are included, it is 
because of the breadth of the language used. However, 
the language is easily as susceptible to defining '' resi-
dent'' employees irrespective of their location or capac-
ity. It should be noted also that the title appraises the 
reader of what new addition is being made to the law. 
The 1957 law required withholding from non-residents ; 
Chapter 111 merely added to the present law so as to 
include residents in addition to non-residents. There is 
no inconsistency between the title and the body. The 
title says the bill applies withholding tax provisions to 
resident employees and the body of the act so provides. 
It should be remembered that part of the contention of 
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the appellant is that the title does not clearly express 
the subject of the body. This is obviously erroneous 
since the title does express the contents of the body. The 
general subject under legislation was withholding taxes, 
and this is clearly expressed in the title. 
The fact that it is possible to construe the act as 
including non-resident employees as well as resident 
employees does not invalidate the act on the ground that 
no mention of non-resident employees is made in the 
title. A title need not set out every possible construction 
or proviso of the body. Detroit v. Detroit Citizens St. 
Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368; Sutherland, supra, Sec. 1716. As 
is said in Sutherland, op. cit. : 
"A title is not defective because it fails to set 
forth the details of an enactment. Numerous pro-
visions may be included under a brief, general 
title, and the title need not, indeed, for purpose 
of readability, should not be made an index to or 
an abstract of the contents of a statute. Particu-
lars are to be found in the act not in the caption." 
It is clear that the act in question deals with only 
one subject, withholding taxes. It clearly expresses in 
the title the subjects covered in the body. The additions 
to the law then in force are made clear. The fact that 
some interpretation not expressed in direct language in 
the body of the act is conceivable that will cover an addi-
tional class (not an additional subject) not expressed in 
the title is not contrary to the Utah Constitution. In Re 
Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 Pac. 810; 1J1arlineau v. Crabbs, 46 
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Utah 327, 150 Pac. 301; State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 
P. 2d 414. 
In the field of taxation the Utah Supreme Court 
has held titles that were less generous than the one under 
consideration not to violate Article VI, Section 23, Elder 
u. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 Pac. 367; State Tax Com-
mission v. City of Logan., 88 Utah 406, 54 P. 2d 1197. 
Thus in the case of Salt La:ke Union Stock Yards v. State 
Tax Commission,, 93 Utah 166, 71 P. 2d 538, the court 
held an amendment to the Sales Tax Act then in force, 
not contrary to Article VI, Section 23 because certain 
dispensations of collected revenue were made to the 
school district funds. It must be concluded that the body 
of Chapter 111, Laws of Utah is sufficiently related to 
the title so as to avoid any constitutional objection. 
The Utah Legislature meets but for sixty days every 
two years. During that time they must consider a vast 
amount of problems and consider volumes of bills. 
Although they must be held to the mandate of the Con-
stitution, the latter should not be so construed as to make 
valid and important legislation void because in critical 
examination one could have better expressed their intent. 
POINT IV. 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT BINDING UPON 
THE APPELLANT, AND ALL OTHERS WHOM IT 
PURPORTS TO AFFECT. 
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From the above it follows that Chapter 111, Laws 
of Utah 1959 is a constitutional legislative proviso 
binding upon the plaintiff, and the lower Court correctly 
granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant 
against plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above arguments of law and facts it 
appears manifest that no constitutional provision either 
procedural or substantive was violated by the passage 
of Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959. This being so, 
appellant must comply with the provisions thereof to 
the degree they effect it. 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
